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UNITED STATES V. AUERNHEIMER AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO BE TRIED IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH
THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant "the right to .. trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law."' For most of the nation's history, except for a
"continuing offense" such as conspiracy, federal courts generally required that a federal crime
be prosecuted in the single district in which it was deemed to have been committed.2
After 1970, however, as prosecutors increasingly resorted to multi-count and multi-
defendant indictments,3 the established approach to venue often made it difficult to bring all
potential charges in the same district. During this period, some commentators began to
question the traditional approach to venue. In particular, a 1983 Note in the Michigan Law
Review argued that "the overriding consideration in venue problems should be the accessibility
of witnesses and tangible evidence for investigation and use at trial," and that "the
constitutional test should not be employed rigidly, but rather in the manner necessary to
facilitate factfinding." 4
Relying in part on that student Note, the Second Circuit, in its 1985 decision in
United States v. Reed, opined that the traditional method of determining the constitutionally
permissible venue had been plagued by "an analytic flaw." 6 "Both courts and commentators
have tended to construe the constitutional venue requirement as fixing a single proper situs for
trial," the Second Circuit wrote, but "where the acts constituting the crime and the nature of the
crime charged implicate more than one location, the constitution does not command a single
exclusive venue."7 "[T]o determine constitutional venue," courts should not seek to identify
one district where an alleged offense was committed, the Second Circuit explained, but instead
should apply "a substantial contacts rule that takes into account a number of factors-the site
of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). Unlike the venue provision of Article III, which refers to the place of trial,
the Sixth Amendment refers to the geographical unit from which the jury is to be drawn. But the Supreme Court has
long interpreted the Sixth Amendment as a venue provision guaranteeing the accused the right to be tried in the state
and district where the crime was committed. See Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 364 (1912). As explained in United States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1980),
Literally, the provision in Article III is a venue provision since it specifies the place of trial,
whereas the provision in the Sixth Amendment is a vicinage provision since it specifies the
place from which the jurors are to be selected. This distinction, however, has never been given
any weight, perhaps because it is unlikely that jurors from one district would be asked to serve
at a trial in another district, or perhaps, more importantly, because the requirement that the jury
be chosen from the state and district where the crime was committed presupposes that the jury
will sit where it is chosen.
Id. at 977 n.3.
2 See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 818 (5th Cir. 1994) (enbanc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing "the
proclivity of prosecutors to file multi-count indictments"); United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing "the current spate of multi-count indictments charging multiple defendants and requiring the commitment of
literally weeks and months of trial time"); United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he District
Court had commendable motives in seeking to deal with the United States Attorney's policy of presenting overly
lengthy indictments."); United States v. Mejias, 417 F. Supp. 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (referring to "this age of
multi-defendant, multi-count indictments").
4 Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82 MICH. L. REV. 90, 95, 108
(1983).
United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985).
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criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding."' The Second
Circuit proceeded to overrule a decision concerning venue for obstruction of justice charges
that had stood since 1951 and had been decided by three of the court's leading jurists, Chief
Judge Thomas Walter Swan and Judges Augustus and Learned Hand.9
In the three decades since Reed, the Second Circuit, in its own words, has "alternately
applied and ignored the substantial contacts test."10 That test has had a greater impact in the
Sixth Circuit, which adopted it a year after Reed was decided and has continued to apply it.I
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have also discussed the test with approval,12 although the
Fourth Circuit, citing intervening Supreme Court decisions, later questioned the decision in
13 14which it had done so. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the test.
Recently, in United States v. Auernheimer, the government invoked Reed in urging
the Third Circuit to uphold venue in a prosecution against a well-known Internet "troll." 15
Together with a collaborator, the defendant wrote a computer program that collected more than
100,000 e-mail addresses of iPad 3G users from AT&T's website, where they had been
inadvertently left available on public servers.16 To publicize what he had done, the defendant
informed the media and later shared the e-mail addresses with a reporter who expressed
interest in writing a story.17 The reporter then wrote a story that described the security flaw,
identified the names of some of the persons whose e-mail addresses had been collected, and
included redacted images of a few e-mail addresses.
The defendant's actions occurred in Arkansas, and the servers were located in Atlanta
and Dallas.19 Nevertheless, the government obtained an indictment and conviction in New
Jersey, the residence of a small percentage of the iPad 3G users whose e-mail addresses were
collected.20
Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
See id. at 478 n.1 (overruling United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1951)).
'o United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). Compare United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 86, 92-94
(2d Cir. 2000) (applying Reed's substantial contacts rule and emphasizing that "in today's wired world of
telecommunication and technology, it is often difficult to determine exactly where a crime was committed, since
different elements may be widely scattered in both time and space, and those elements may not coincide with the
accused's actual presence"), with United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding, without citation
to Reed, that venue for securities fraud charge was improper because "venue is not proper in a district in which the
only acts performed by the defendant were preparatory to the offense and not part of the offense" (quoting United
States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1190 (2d. Cir. 1989)). See also United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d
179, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) (treating Reed as applicable only to continuing offenses); United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d
886, 895 (2d Cir. 2008) ("in this Circuit, venue must not only involve some activity in the situs district but also satisfy
the 'substantial contacts' test of Reed"); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).
" See United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 423 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, 274 F.3d 1079, 1084 (6th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986).
12 See United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying in part on Reed's substantial
contacts rule); United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
" United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Our reasoning in Cofield ... cannot be reconciled
with the Supreme Court's later decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno.") (citing United States v. Cabrales, 524
U.S. 1 (1998); United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999)).
14 See United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011).
' 748 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 2014).
16 Id. at 530-31.
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The Third Circuit reversed for lack of venue.21 The venue of criminal trials "has been
fundamental since our country's founding,"2 2 the court emphasized, and "cybercrimes do not
happen in some metaphysical location that justifies disregarding constitutional limits on
venue."23 The government invoked Reed's substantial contacts test (which the Third Circuit
had quoted with approval in a prior decision 24) and pointed to the third factor enumerated in
Reed-the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct-but the Auernheimer panel was not
persuaded.25 A crime's effects can establish venue, it concluded, only in "situations in which
'an essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of its effects."' 26
Although the defendant in Auernheimer was disappointed that the court did not reach
his contention that his conduct was lawful,2 7 procedure can be as important as substance.28 By
rejecting the government's reliance on Reed to justify trying the defendant far from his home,
in a place with no more connection to the alleged offenses than many other states, the Third
Circuit reaffirmed a significant constitutional right and wisely gave short shrift to a test that
would confer excessive power on prosecutors.
SECTION I: THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO VENUE
A. ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S VENUE PROVISIONS
The venue provisions of the Constitution are linked to some of the significant events
leading up to the American Revolution, including the June 1768 seizure of John Hancock's
sloop Liberty by customs officers in Boston.29 The seizure occurred after a tidesman who had
attended the ship when it had arrived in the city the preceding month changed his story and
asserted that he had been held in a cabin while wine was surreptitiously unloaded.3 0 When
customs officers arranged for the Liberty to be towed out to the Romney, a British ship whose
captain had recently angered Bostonians by forcibly enlisting seamen serving on inbound
vessels,31 a riot ensued.32 British efforts to impose criminal penalties against the rioters came to
naught, in part because grand jurors were selected through town meetings and radical colonists
controlled the Boston Town Meeting and in part because no witnesses willing to testify against
the rioters could be found.33
Parliament responded by turning its attention to a 1543 statute under which persons
accused of treason "outside the realm" could be tried "before such commissioners, and in such
shire of the realm, as shall be assigned by the King's majesty's commission."3 4 In January
1769, the House of Commons approved an address to the King recommending trial in England,
21 Id. at 541.
22 Id. at 532.
23 Id. at 541.
24 See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987).
25 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 536-37.
26 Id. at 537 (quoting United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2000)).
27 Emmett Rensin, This Infamous Hacker Went to Prison for Trolling AT&T. Now He Wants to Troll Wall Street, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117477/andrew-weev-auernheimers-tro-llc-could-
send-him-back-prison.
28 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[I]f put to the
choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law
procedures than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices.").
29 Hiller B. Zobel, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 73 (1971).
o Id. at 74.
Id. at 73-74.
32 Id. at 75.
" Id. at 77.
34 Treason Act, 1543, 35 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.).
40 VOL. 6
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pursuant to the 1543 statute, of the persons most active in the commission of treason and
misprision of treason in the Massachusetts Bay colony.35
When the legislature of Virginia received news of Parliament's action in May 1769, it
promptly passed a resolution proclaiming that any trial for treason or misprision of treason
committed in Virginia should be held in Virginia:
Resolved . . . that all Trials for Treason, Misprison of Treason, or for any
Felony or Crime whatsoever, committed and done in this his Majesty's said
Colony and Dominion, by any Person or Persons residing therein, ought of
Right to be had, and conducted in and before his Majesty's Courts, held
within the said Colony; . . . and that the seizing [of] any Person or Persons,
residing in this Colony, [suspected] of any Crime whatsoever, committed
therein; and sending such Person, or Persons, to Places beyond the Sea, to be
tried, is highly derogatory of the Rights of British Subjects; as thereby the
inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury from the Vicinage, as well as
the Liberty of summoning and producing Witnesses on such Trial, will be
taken away from the Party accused.3 6
Two months later, the lower house of the Massachusetts General Court similarly
approved a resolution denouncing the prospective removal to England of colonists "suspected
of any Crime whatsoever" committed in Massachusetts Bay.37
These resolutions did not cause Parliament to change course. In 1772, it enacted a
statute providing that "[p]ersons charged with destroying "'in any place out of this realm' the
King's dock yards, magazines, ships, ammunition," or supplies could be indicted "'either in
any shire or county within this realm' or 'in such island, country, or place, where such offense
shall have been actually committed."' 3 8
Royal authorities did not in fact try any colonists in England for alleged crimes
committed in the colonies.39 But Parliament's actions in 1769 and 1772 were not forgotten: In
1774 the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress proclaimed "[t]hat the
respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the
great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the
course of that law." 4 0 In 1776, the Declaration of Independence denounced King George III
"[fjor transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended [offenses]."4 1
1 William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV.
59, 62-64 (1944); Zobel, supra note 29, at 109. After the Boston Massacre in March 1770, Parliament also passed a
law, American Rebellion Act, 1774, 14 Geo. III, c. 39, intending to protect British soldiers who were charged in
Massachusetts with capital offenses on the basis of actions taken in suppressing riots or enforcing the revenue laws.
See, Blume, supra; Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 807 (1976). If the governor concluded that "an
indifferent trial" could not be held in Massachusetts, the defendant could be tried in England or another colony.
Kershen, supra, at 807.
3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1766-1769 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., Virginia, 1906).
1 Neil L. York, Imperial Impotence: Treason in 1774 Massachusetts, 29 LAw & HIST. REV. 657, 659 (2011).
Blume, supra note 35, at 63 (quoting 12 Geo. III, c. 24 (1772)).
See York, supra note 37, at 659.
40 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Oct. 14, 1774, reprinted in Documents Illustrative of
the Formation of the Union of the American States 3, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. Doc. No. 398 (1927).
41 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
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In the original Constitution, Article III required that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . .
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."42 The anti-
Federalists considered that provision inadequate.4 3 Richard Henry Lee of Virginia had asked in
October 1787: "What, then, becomes of the jury of the vicinage, or at least from the county, in
the first instance-the states being from fifty to seven hundred miles in extent?"4 4 In
September 1789, James Madison introduced in the House of Representatives an amendment
which provided that "[t]he trial of all crimes ... shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of
the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
accustomed requisites."45 The House passed that amendment with little change, but the Senate
did not go along, apparently in part because of objections to the inclusion of a vicinage
requirement.4 6 A conference committee then produced the words later included in the Sixth
Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."4 7
Thus, in lieu of incorporating into the Constitution the jury of the vicinage as it
existed at common law, the Sixth Amendment tied venue to the large judicial districts being
48created by Congress. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, most districts were the size of an
entire state.4 9 The Act created thirteen judicial districts within the eleven states that by then had
ratified the Constitution, with Massachusetts and Virginia each having two districts and the
other states each having a single district.5 0 Today there are ninety-four federal judicial
districts.
B. CASE LAw BEFORE REED
At common law, offenses were understood (for jurisdictional purposes) to occur in
one place, which in some instances was the place of the critical act or omission and in other
instances was the place of the required result:
[T]he common law picked out one particular act (or omission) or result of the
act (or omission) as vital for the determination of the place of commission
(i.e. the situs) of each of the various crimes and gave jurisdiction to that state
(and only that state) where the vital act or result occurred. Generally, it may
be said that the situs of a crime at common law is the place of the act (or
omission) if the crime is defined only in these terms, and the place of the
result if the definition of the crime includes such a result. 52
42 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 3.
43 See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 105
(1923).
44 1 JOHNATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 504 (2d. ed. 1836).
45 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
46 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1970).
47 See id at 95-96; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 96; Blume, supra note 35, at 66.
49 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.
5o id.
5' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131. Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implements the Sixth Amendment by
providing that "[u]nless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a
district where the offense was committed."
52 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4(a), at 295 (2d ed. 2003); see RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWs § 428 (1934).
42 VOL. 6
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It was established, for example, that "homicide is committed, not at the place from which the
killer started the fatal force, but where it impinged upon the body of the victim," 5 and that
"robbery is committed where the property is taken from the victim and not where he was first
seized, or where the property was subsequently taken."54
Prior to Reed, federal case law concerning venue in criminal cases was similar to the
common law approach to jurisdiction in that venue generally was deemed proper only in a
single district.55 That was not so for so-called "continuing offenses," and it was not so for
56certain other offenses, but for most offenses, courts recognized only one permissible venue.
Case law generally distinguished between continuing offenses and offenses consisting of "'a
single act which occurs at one time and at one place in which only it may be tried, although
preparation for its commission may take place elsewhere."'5 7 That "single act" might or might
not be viewed as occurring where the defendant was physically located at the time of his
criminal conduct.58
Thus, in Burton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that charges against a
United States Senator of receiving compensation in a matter in which the United States was
interested could not be brought in the Eastern District of Missouri, where the checks were paid
by the drawee bank.5 9 Each of the checks was received, indorsed, and deposited by the
60 61defendant in the District of Columbia.60 A company in Saint Louis mailed the checks to him.
The bank where the checks were deposited gave the defendant immediate credit for the
62amounts involved. The Court ruled that the offenses were committed in the District of
Columbia, and that "[t]here was no beginning of the offense in Missouri."6 3
In United States v. Lombardo, a case decided during World War I, the Justices
unanimously ruled that the District of Columbia was the proper venue for a charge of failure to
comply with a provision of the Mann Act requiring anyone maintaining an alien woman for
purposes of prostitution to file a statement containing specified information with the
Commissioner General of Immigration, whose office was located in the District.64 The Justices
rejected the government's "conten[tion] that the offense was a continuing one" that extended
from the Western District of Washington, where the defendant maintained the woman, to the
65District of Columbia. No case had been cited, Justice McKenna explained, "which decides
5 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 1, § 3, at 40 (3d ed. 1982).
54 Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
See United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164-66 (1st Cir. 2004). The venue for some federal offenses is governed
by specific venue statutes: "If the statute under which the defendant is charged contains a specific venue provision,
that provision must be honored (assuming, of course, that it satisfies the constitutional minima)." Id. at 164.
56 Id. at 165.
5 United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) (quoting Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752,
754 (4th Cir. 1938)); see also United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir. 1989) ("When
a crime consists of a single noncontinuing act, it is 'committed' in the district where the act is performed.").
51 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 515, 516-18 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that offense of
jumping bail can be prosecuted in the district in which bail was set and reserving question whether it can be prosecuted
elsewhere); United States v. Roche, 611 F.2d 1180, 1183 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that offense of jumping bail
can be prosecuted in the district in which bail was set and reserving question whether it can be prosecuted where the
defendant was located when he jumped bail).
5 196 U.S. 283, 297-299 (1905).
60 Id. at 296.
61 Id. at 304.
62 Id. at 297.
63 Id. at 304.
64241 U.S. 73, 74 (1916).
65 See id. at 76.
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that the requirement of a statute . . . that a paper shall be filed with a particular officer, is
satisfied by a deposit in the post office at some distant place."6 6
In a 1946 decision, United States v. Anderson, the Court ruled that the place where the
defendant refused to take the oath of induction was the proper venue for a charge under the
Selective Training and Service Act for refusal to submit to induction and that the charge could
not be brought where the draft board that issued the order to report for induction was located.6 7
Similarly, a decade later, a divided Court held in Johnston v. United States that when
conscientious objectors were ordered by their local draft boards to report for civilian work at
hospitals in other judicial districts, but failed to report for work as ordered, venue under the
Sixth Amendment lay in the districts where the men were required to report.68 The six-Justice
majority relied on "the general rule that where the crime charged is a failure to do a legally
required act, the place fixed for its performance fixes the situs of the crime."
6 9
The Court also viewed as a single-act offense the crime charged in another case
decided by a 6-3 vote, Travis v. United States,7 one of the high court's many post-World War
II decisions involving measures aimed at Communist subversion.7 1 Travis concerned the
proper venue for a charge against a union officer under the federal false statement statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1001, for an alleged falsehood in a "non-Communist" affidavit filed pursuant to the
72Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which had amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The
affidavit at issue, though executed in Colorado, was mailed to the National Labor Relations
Board in Washington, D.C., where it was received and filed.7 3 Speaking through Justice
Douglas, the Court held that venue was improper in Colorado and that the prosecution should
have been brought in Washington.7 4 Justice Douglas pointed to the provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act barring any Board investigation or issuance of a complaint in matters concerning a
union "'unless there [was] on file with the Board' a non-Communist affidavit of each union
officer," as well as the language in § 1001 (as it then existed) penalizing the making of a false
statement "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States."75 Justice Harlan dissented and was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Clark. In his
66 Id. at 78.
67 328 U.S. 699, 704-06 (1946).
68 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956).
69 Id.
70364 U.S. 631 (1961).
7 Travis was one of the "roughly one hundred decisions in 'Communist' cases" decided by the Supreme Court from
the October 1949 Term through the October 1961 Term. Robert M. Lichtman, McCarthyism and the Court: The Need
for "an Uncommon Portion of Fortitude in the Judges", 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 107, 108 (2014). Through the 1954
Term, the Court generally ruled for the government in "Communist" cases. See id. In the next two Terms, "it issued a
number of decisions in favor of accused Communists that triggered harsh attacks upon the Court," id., as well as
efforts in Congress, which very nearly succeeded, to curtail the Court's jurisdiction. See id. at 120-22. In the 1957
Term, "outcomes were mixed." Id. at 119. "In the 1958 Term, the government prevailed in two major First
Amendment decisions, and in the 1959 Term it won every one of the handful of cases decided ... [Justice] Frankfurter
was now a consistent vote for the government and . . . the leader of a five-Justice conservative majority . . . in
'Communist' cases." Id. at 122. The usual minority in such cases became Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Douglas, and Brennan. See id. at 119, 122-23. In the 1960 Term, during which Travis was decided, there were "fifteen
signed decisions" in "Communist" cases. Id. at 123. "The government prevailed in nine (a tenth had a mixed result),
every one over the dissenting votes of Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan." Id. In Travis, that quartet again voted
against the government, and this time they were joined by Justices Whitaker and Stewart to produce a six-Justice
majority in the defendant's favor. See 364 U.S. at 632, 637.
72 Travis, 364 U.S. at 631, 632-33.
" Id. at 633.
74 Id. at 636-37.
1 Id. at 635.
76 Id. at 637.
44 VOL. 6
8
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol6/iss1/3
"FUNDAMENTAL SINCE OUR COUNTRY'S FOUNDING"
view, the offense charged began in Colorado and was completed in the District of Columbia
and, under the continuing offense statute, could be prosecuted in either place.7 7
The traditional approach to venue sometimes did not yield clear answers. For
example, charges of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 150378 raised a difficult issue
where the obstructive conduct occurred in one district and the proceeding that the defendant
allegedly intended to influence was in another district. In a 1971 decision, United States v.
Swann, the District of Columbia Circuit held that venue lay only in the district where the
obstructive conduct occurred.79 Swann was consistent with a 1951 decision of the Second
Circuit, United States v. Brothman, a case involving two defendants indicted as a result of the
same espionage investigation that later led to the trial, conviction, and execution of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg.so
Beginning in the 1970s, however, many federal courts of appeals chose not to follow
Swann and Brothman. The first appellate court to reject those cases was the Sixth Circuit. In
United States v. O'Donnell, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that "[u]nder Sec. 1503, the effect of
corrupt conduct is always intended to occur only at one place: viz., the place or district in
which the court sits or in which the proceeding is pending."" The Sixth Circuit also viewed
§ 1503 as "a codification of the court's power to punish contempts committed outside of its
presence, albeit by criminal prosecution following indictment,"8 2 and interpreted a 1941
Supreme Court decision as having "strongly implied ... that such contempts are punishable by
the court whose authority is challenged regardless of where the contemptuous acts may have
occurred."8 3 Between 1980 and 1987, the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits followed the
Sixth Circuit and held venue proper for a charge under § 1503 in the district of the relevant
court or grand jury proceeding.8 4 (In its 1985 decision in Reed, which is discussed in the next
section, the Second Circuit reached the same result as those courts, but unlike them, it
premised its decision on a new approach to venue.)5 In 1988, Congress resolved the circuit
split by providing that charges under § 1503 or under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which prohibits
tampering with witnesses, victims, or informants, may be prosecuted either in the district of the
relevant court or grand jury proceeding, or in the district in which the conduct constituting the
alleged offense occurred.8 6
Continuing offenses have long received special treatment for purposes of venue. In
the Supreme Court's words,
" Id. at 637-4 1. Other cases illustrating the traditional understanding of the Constitution's venue provisions include
United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704-06 (1946); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 296-304 (1905);
United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 169 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 220-21 (2d Cir.
1966); and Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1938).
71 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
1 441 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
8o 191 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1951), overruled by United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 485 (2d Cir. 1985).
81510 F.2d 1190, 1194 (6th Cir. 1975).
82 Id. at 1195.
8 Id. (discussing Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941)).
84 See United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 658-59 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454-55
(4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Barham, 666 F.2d 521, 523-24 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d
902, 904-06 (1st Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Frederick, 835 F.2d 1211, 1214 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that charge of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 could be brought in the district of the affected grand jury
proceeding, rather than where the witness tampering occurred) (overruling United States v. Nadolny, 601 F.2d 940,
942-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1510 of obstructing a criminal investigation could only
be brought where the alleged beating of the witness took place)).
85 Reed, 773 F.2d at 486.
86 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i).
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A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however
long a time it may occupy. Where such an act or series of acts runs through
several jurisdictions, the offense is committed and cognizable in each.8 7
The federal code has contained a general venue provision for continuing offenses
since 1867.'" The original continuing offense statute provided that "[w]hen any offense against
the United States is begun in one judicial district and completed in another, it shall be deemed
to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and
punished in either district, in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed
therein."8 9 So the law remained until the recodification of the federal criminal code in 1948.90
The continuing offense statute enacted as part of that recodification (18 U.S.C. § 3237)
contained one paragraph similar to the prior statute and a second paragraph aimed at crimes
involving the mails or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress,
any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in
another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and
prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed.
Any offense involving the use of the mails, [or] transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce, . . . is a continuing offense and, except as
otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of
and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce,
[or] mail matter moves.91
In 1958, these two paragraphs became 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).92 In 1984, Congress expanded the
provision of § 3237(a) concerning transportation in interstate or foreign commerce to reach an
offense involving "the importation of an object or person into the United States."93
Courts applying the traditional approach to venue held that some offenses not
classified as continuing offenses nevertheless could be prosecuted in more than one district
where their elements implicated multiple districts. For example, the Fourth Circuit ruled in
1982 that a charge that a union representative received a payment of money from an employer,
in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, could be brought "either wherever commerce is
affected"-the provision in question applies only to representatives of employees employed in
an industry affecting commerce-"or wherever the proscribed act occurs."94
8 United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (quoting Armour Pacing Co., v. United States,
153 F. 1, 5-6 (8th Cir. 1907), aff'd, 209 U.S. 56 (1908)); see Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634 (1961)
(explaining a continuing offense "is held, for venue purposes, to have been committed wherever the wrongdoer
roamed"); United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 (1958); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944) ("By
utilizing the doctrine of a continuing offense, Congress may . . . provide that the locality of a crime shall extend over
the whole area through which force propelled by an offender operates."); United States v. Canal Barge Co., 631 F.3d
347, 351 (6th Cir. 2011).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1948) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484).
89 Id.
9o See 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1948).
9' 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1948) (originally enacted at Act of June 25, 1923, ch. 645, § 3237, 62 Stat. 826).
92 See Pub. L. No. 85-595, 72 Stat. 512 (1958).
9 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 1204, 98 Stat. 2152 (1984). The Second
Circuit has held that the offense of mail fraud is not an "offense involving the use of the mails" within the meaning of
§ 3237(a). United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1999).
94 United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 322-23, 333 (4th Cir. 1982).
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SECTION II: REED-THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTACTS TEST
In United States v. Reed, the Second Circuit embraced a novel approach to
determining where venue is proper under the Constitution. The criminal charges in Reed arose
from a civil case in which Thomas Reed and others had been sued for allegedly making illegal
insider purchases of call options.95 The civil case had been filed in the Southern District of
New York, but Reed's deposition in the case had been taken in San Francisco.96 Federal
prosecutors later obtained an indictment in the Southern District of New York charging that at
his deposition Reed (i) gave false testimony in violation of the false declarations statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1623, and (ii) obstructed justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 by relying on
handwritten notes that he passed off as contemporaneous but that in fact were created after the
fact (in Virginia and California).97 The indictment also charged securities and wire fraud.98 The
district court dismissed the § 1623 and obstruction of justice charges for improper venue,99 but
the Second Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Ralph Winter.100 The court adopted a new
methodology and reversed as to both counts, thus requiring Reed to face charges in the
Southern District of securities fraud, wire fraud, making a false declaration in violation of
§ 1623, and obstruction of justice.101
Noting that neither § 1623 nor the obstruction of justice statute contains a venue
provision, Judge Winter noted that as to each count the court had to "determine 'the locality of
the offense."' 102 But he stressed that "an analytic flaw . .. has plagued analysis in this area."1 03
Although "[b]oth courts and commentators have tended to construe the constitutional venue
requirement as fixing a single proper situs for trial," Judge Winter reasoned that "where the
acts constituting the crime and the nature of the crime charged implicate more than one
location, the constitution does not command a single exclusive venue." 104 Rather, "[t]he
constitution requires only that the venue chosen be determined from the nature of the crime
charged as well as from the location of the act or acts constituting it, and that it not be contrary
to an explicit policy underlying venue law."1 05
But having indicated that a policy underlying venue law may impose a limitation,
Judge Winter then emphasized that "the precise policies to be furthered by venue law are not
clearly defined."106 "[F]airness to defendants cannot be the sole grounds for determining
venue," he wrote, "because the most convenient venue for them may often have little, if any,
connection with the crimes charged."107 Judge Winter gave the example of "[a] foreign courier
1 United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477,478 (2d Cir. 1985).
96 Id. at 478.
9 Id. at 479. Although the Reed opinion refers to the § 1623 charge as a perjury charge, § 1623 was enacted as part of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in order to relieve the government of some of the burdens associated with
prosecutions for perjury as traditionally defined, specifically, the two-witness and direct evidence rules. Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, tit. IV, § 401(a), 84 Stat. 932 (1970); H.R REP. No. 91-1549, at 33
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4008.
9' Reed, 773 F.2d at 479.
9 Id. at 479. When a defendant is indicted for more than one offense, venue must be proper with respect to each count.
See, e.g., United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 220-22 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 198-201
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
l00 Judges Meskill and Kearse joined the opinion.
'o' Reed, 773 F.2d at 482-87.
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attempting to import illegal drugs through Kennedy Airport," noting that such a defendant
"will not find the Eastern District of New York particularly convenient."os
Judge Winter concluded his re-examination of venue law by articulating this standard:
[T]here is no single defined policy or mechanical test to determine
constitutional venue. Rather, the test is best described as a substantial
contacts rule that takes into account a number of factors - the site of the
defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect
of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate
factfinding - which we discuss seriatim.109
Reed implied that, to establish that venue is proper for a given charge, the government
is not required to show that any particular one of the four factors identified supports venue, as
long as another factor or factors sufficiently support venue. Since one of the factors is "the
elements and nature of the crime," the rule could be read to imply that venue can be proper
even in a district where no element of the offense occurred.110 Such a result would seemingly
be contrary to the Supreme Court's declaration that "[t]he constitutional specification is
geographic; and the geography prescribed is the district or districts within which the offense is
committed.""' In Reed itself, the Second Circuit did not have to confront that apparent
contradiction because the venue that the government had chosen in that case-the Southern
District of New York-was closely tied to an essential element of each of the charges at
issue.112 The § 1623 charge required that the false statement occur "in any proceeding before
or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States."113 The proceeding relied upon by
the government was the civil securities action, which was pending in the Southern District.114
With respect to the obstruction of justice charge, the court, before deciding whether venue was
proper, held that "the existence of an ongoing formal proceeding is an element of a § 1503
violation." 15 The proceeding in question was pending in the Southern District, so again an
essential element of the charge was directly linked to the venue selected by the government.
In discussing the § 1623 count, Judge Winter also reasoned (i) that "Reed's testimony
was inextricably bound to the Southern District" since the civil action in that district was the
sole source of federal jurisdiction over the deposition, and the Southern District's local rules
applied to the deposition, and (ii) that "the locus of the intended effects of the alleged criminal
conduct was in the Southern District of New York because the alleged perjury was intended to
affect the outcome of an action pending there."1 16 Similarly, in addressing the obstruction of
justice charge, Judge Winter stressed that "the source of federal jurisdiction and the locus of
harm are in the district of the pending parent proceeding."117 Particularly by attributing
significance to "the locus of the intended effects" in analyzing the § 1623 charge, Judge Winter
illustrated that his new approach could significantly broaden the government's choice of
venue, for § 1623 imposes liability entirely without regard to whether the defendant intended
' Id. at 481.
109 Id.
110 Id.
11 United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704-05 (1946); accord United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958)
"The Constitution makes it clear that determination of proper venue in a criminal case requires determination of where
the crime was committed.").
112 Reed, 773 U.S. at 483-86.
" Id. at 482.
14 Id. at 478.
"
5 Id. at 485.
16 Id. at 483-84.
" Id. at 486.
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to affect the court or grand jury proceeding in which the declaration was made." If the intent
to cause effects in a district could support venue in that district even if such intent is not
required to establish guilt, the government's latitude in selecting a venue would be greatly
increased.
Reed has elicited divergent reactions in the thirty years since it was decided. The
Tenth Circuit has "decline[d] to adopt [Reed's] 'substantial contacts' test,"1 19 observing:
The Constitution and Rule 18 are clear: a crime must be prosecuted in the
district where it was committed. It is true that in some cases a crime may be
committed in multiple districts. . . . However, that a crime may be committed
in multiple districts means only that venue may be proper in any district
where the crime was committed-not that venue is proper in every district
which has "substantial contacts" with the crime.1 2 0
The Sixth Circuit, however, has embraced Reed's substantial contacts rule. 12 The Seventh
Circuit has also looked to the rule for guidance.122 The Fourth Circuit did at one time but has
since questioned the decision in which it did so.1 23 In the Second Circuit itself, Reed's
substantial contacts rule has received inconsistent treatment.124 How the rule has fared in the
Third Circuit is discussed in Part IV below.
SECTION III: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN CABRALES AND RODRIGUEZ-MORENO
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1998 and 1999, after Reed but well before
Auernheimer, contributed to the Auernheimer court's rejection of the government's argument
that it should sustain venue on the basis of Reed's substantial contacts test.
In the 1998 decision, United States v. Cabrales, the Supreme Court addressed the
proper venue for two money laundering offenses that Congress had created in 1986:125
(1) "conduct[ing] ... a financial transaction" involving the proceeds of "specified unlawful
activity" (a term defined by statute) "to avoid a transaction-reporting requirement" and
(2) "engag[ing] ... in a monetary transaction" in property that is worth more than $10,000126
and constitutes or is derived from proceeds of "specified unlawful activity." 12 The defendant
allegedly had deposited $40,000 in a bank in Florida and then made four separate withdrawals
of $9,500 from the bank. 12 The funds deposited and later withdrawn were traceable to
unlawful sales of narcotics,129 which fall within the statutory definition of "specified unlawful
... Id. at 484. See, e.g., United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating the essential elements of a
§ 1623 offense are "(i) the declarant must be under oath, (ii) the testimony must be given in a proceeding before a
court of the United States, (iii) the witness must knowingly make, (iv) a false statement, and (v) the testimony must be
material to the proof of the crime").
... United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011).
120 Id. (citations omitted).
121 See United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 423 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, 274 F.3d 1079, 1084 (6th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986) ("We now adopt the substantial contacts
test as well as the rationale and framework of analysis articulated by the Reed court.").
122 See United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2007).
123 See supra note 13.
124 See cases cited supra note 10.
125 United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 3 (1998).
126 Id.
127 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2012).
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activity."130 The sales took place in Missouri.131 The charges (both of which alleged
substantive offenses 132) were brought in the Western District of Missouri.133 The Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that venue was improper.134
Quoting Anderson, the Justices adhered to the principle that "[T]he locus delicti must
be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts
constituting it."135 But for the unlawful sales in Missouri, the Florida transactions would have
been lawful. The Court nevertheless ruled that the Western District of Missouri was an
improper venue because "the Government indicted Cabrales 'for transactions which began,
continued, and were completed only in Florida. "136 Although the government had "urg[ed] the
efficiency of trying Cabrales in Missouri, because evidence in that State, and not in Florida,
shows that the money Cabrales allegedly laundered derived from unlawful activity," the Court
was not persuaded.1 3 7
A year later, the Justices decided United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno.138 Like the
charges in Cabrales, the charge in Rodriguez-Moreno required proof of underlying unlawful
activity.139 But unlike the charges in Cabrales, the charge in Rodriguez-Moreno required proof
that the defendant was criminally responsible for the underlying activity.140 Whereas the
occurrence in Missouri of "specified unlawful activity" for which the defendant in Cabrales
was not criminally responsible did make venue proper in Missouri for charges based on
conduct in Florida,141 the Court ruled in Rodriguez-Moreno that the defendant's commission
of a crime (kidnapping) that occurred in part in New Jersey supported venue in New Jersey as
to a firearms charge based on conduct in Maryland because the defendant's involvement in the
kidnapping was a predicate for the firearms charge.142
The charges in Rodriguez-Moreno arose, as the Court explained, from events that
began with "a drug transaction that took place in Houston, Texas," in which "a New York drug
dealer stole 30 kilograms of a Texas drug distributor's cocaine."143 The distributor hired
Rodriguez-Moreno and others to search for the drug dealer and to hold the middleman captive
while doing so.14 Rodriguez-Moreno and his collaborators took the middleman from Texas to
New Jersey and then to Maryland, where Rodriguez-Moreno put a .357 magnum revolver to
the back of the middleman's neck but did not fire. 1 4 5 Federal prosecutors in New Jersey
secured an indictment against Rodriguez-Moreno that not only charged conspiracy to kidnap
and kidnapping, but also charged carrying a firearm in relation to the kidnapping in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).146 Rodriguez-Moreno challenged venue on the firearm charge,
"'o See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(a).
'3' Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 4.
132 Cabrales was also charged with conspiracy, but that charge was not before the high court. See id. at 4-5.
133 Id. at 4.
134 Id. at 3-4.
'35 Id. at 6-7 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946)).
136 Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 109 F.3d 471, 472 (8th Cir. 1997), amended by 115 F.3d 621 (1997)).
'3 Id. at 9-10.
131 United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno 526 U.S. 275 (1999).
131 Id. at 280.
140 Id.
141 Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 8.
142 Rodriguez -Moreno, 526 U.S. at 281.
143 Id. at 276.
14 Id. at 276-77.
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pointing out that his use of a gun occurred in Maryland.147 The Justices ruled that venue on the
firearm charge was nonetheless proper in New Jersey.148
The Court reiterated that the "locus delicti [of the charged offense] must be
determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting
it."149 The Court added this explanation: "In performing this inquiry, a court must initially
identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the
location of the commission of the criminal acts."150
The Court went on to point out that the court of appeals had "overlooked an essential
conduct element of the § 924(c)(1) offense."1 5 1 Section 924(c)(1), the Court explained,
"prohibits using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . for
which [a defendant] may be prosecuted in a court of the United States."152 The Court
"interpret[ed] § 924(c)(1) to contain two distinct conduct elements-as i relevant to this case,
the 'using and carrying' of a gun and the commission of a kidnaping." 15 Because the conduct
satisfying one of those two elements occurred in part in Jersey, venue was proper in New
Jersey.154 In explaining why that result was consistent with Cabrales, the Court distinguished
"circumstance elements" from "conduct elements":
As we interpreted the laundering statutes at issue [in Cabrales], they did not
proscribe "the anterior criminal conduct that yielded the funds allegedly
laundered." The existence of criminally generated proceeds was a
circumstance element of the offense but the proscribed conduct-
defendant's money laundering activity-occurred "'after the fact' of an
offense begun and completed by others. 155
"It does not matter," the Court added, "that [defendant] used the .357 magnum revolver . . .
only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in
Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. ... Where venue is appropriate
for the underlying crime of violence, so too it is for the § 924(c)(1) offense."1 5 6 The Court
expressed no opinion regarding the government's contention that the effects of a defendant's
conduct in a district can establish venue in that district.15 7
Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno reflect a focus on the elements of the offense in the
determination of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno suggests, moreover, that although "conduct
elements" can support venue, "circumstance elements" cannot.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 282.
149 Id. at 279 (bracketed material in original) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946))) (quotation marks omitted).
Iso Id. (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 280.
152 Id. (alteration in original).
1 Id. (emphasis added).
1
54 Id. at 282.
1 Id. at 280 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U. S. 1, 7 (1998)). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Stevens, dissented. Stressing that § 924(c)(1) "prohibits the act of using or carrying a firearm 'during' (and in
relation to) a predicate offense," Justice Scalia reasoned that "we need only ask where the defendant's alleged act of
using a firearm during (and in relation to) a kidnaping occurred. Since it occurred only in Maryland, venue will lie
only there." Id. at 283 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 281-82 (majority opinion).
1' Id. at 279 n.2.
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SECTION IV: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION INAUERNHEIMER
The charges in United States v. Auernheimer that the Third Circuit ultimately held
were brought in the wrong venue concerned events following Apple Computer's introduction
of the iPad portable tablet computer in January 2010. 15 Apple entered into an exclusive
contract with AT&T to provide iPad users with a cellular connection to the Internet, if they
preferred such a connection to a wireless Internet, or "wifi," connection.159 This cellular
service offered to iPad users was known as "3G" service and was available through an account
with AT&T. 160 With a user ID and a password, a user could access his or her AT&T account
through a website created by AT&T. 161 A user's user ID was his or her e-mail address.162
To make access to these accounts easier, AT&T programmed its website so that when
an iPad user communicated with the website, AT&T's servers searched for that iPad user's
Integrated Circuit Card Identifier ("ICC-ID"), "the unique nineteen- or twenty-digit number
that identifies an iPad's Subscriber Identity Module, commonly known as a SIM Card." 163 if
the user had registered his or her account with AT&T, AT&T's servers automatically inserted
the e-mail address associated with the user's ICC-ID in the e-mail part of the login prompt on
AT&T's website.164
The AT&T website attracted the interest of Daniel Spitler, a member of Goatse
Security, a loosely affiliated group of eight programmers who searched for security holes.165
When Spitler visited the AT&T website to sign up for service using a network card he had
purchased, he entered the ICC-ID of his iPad.166 He noticed that his e-mail address appeared on
the AT&T login page.167 He guessed that AT&T servers had derived his e-mail address from
his ICC-ID. 16 Spitler tested his hypothesis by changing the ICC-ID in the URL by one digit;
when he did so, he discovered that a different e-mail address appeared on the login page.169
Spitler then wrote a computer program that he dubbed an "account slurper" to
automate this process.170 The program would visit the AT&T website again and again, each
time using a different ICC-ID.171 "If an email address appeared in the login box, the program
would save that email address to a file under Spitler's control." 172 After Spitler shared what he
had learned with Andrew Auernheimer, who was also a member of Goatse Security,
Auernheimer helped him improve the program.173 Over a four-day period, the program
collected 114,000 e-mail addresses.
174
151 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 2014).
'5 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1816).
1
60 Auerhneimwr, 748 F.3d at 529.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 529-30.
16 Id. at 530.
165 Id.; see also Indictment, Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-470).
1
66 




170 Id. at 530-31.
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Auernheimer e-mailed various members of the media to publicize what he and Spitler
had been able to do.175 Some of the persons whom Auernheimer contacted communicated with
AT&T, which immediately repaired the defect.1 7 6 Ryan Tate, a reporter for the online
publication Gawker, expressed interest in writing a story.1 7 7 Auernheimer explained to Tate
how the e-mail addresses had been collected and sent him a list of the addresses. 178 Gawker
soon ran a story by Tate entitled "Apple's Worst Security Breach: 114,000 iPad Owners
Exposed," which discussed how the e-mail addresses had been obtained.1 79 Tate's story
identified some of the people whose e-mail addresses had been obtained but disclosed "only
redacted images of a few email addresses and ICC-IDs."so
Spitler lived and worked in California.' Auernheimer lived and worked in
Arkansas.182 The servers accessed by the program were located in Texas and Georgia.183 The
Gawker reporter, Tate, was also located outside New Jersey.1 84
Other than the fact that approximately 4,500 of the e-mail addresses at issue belonged
to New Jersey residents,18 5 Auernheimer's actions had no particular connection to New Jersey.
Nevertheless, AT&T, which had had its headquarters in New Jersey from 1992 to 2009, was
able to convince the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey to pursue
charges against Spitler and Auernheimer.186 On January 18, 2011, the FBI arrested
Auernheimer at his home in Fayetteville, Arkansas.18 7 He was transported across the country to
Newark, New Jersey and detained until he was released on $50,000 bond.8
In June 2011, the government secured Spitler's agreement to plead guilty to a two-
count information.189 The first count charged him with conspiring in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), a provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA") that makes it a crime to "intentionally access[ ] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ ] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . .. information from any protected
computer."190 The second count charged Spitler with fraud in connection with personal













117 Id. at 540; Elinor Mills, Hacker in AT&T-iPad Security Case Arrested on Drug Charges, CNET (June 15, 2010),
http://www.cnet.com/news/hacker-in-at-t-ipad-security-case-arrested-on-drug-charges/.
" Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 540; Man Accused of "Brute Force" iPad Hack Freed From Federal Custody, THE
SMOKING GUN (February 28, 2011), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/buster/hacking/man-accused-brute-force-ipad-
hack-freed-federal-custody-02283201.
1'9 Letter from Assistant United States Attorney Zach Intrater to Susan Cassell, Esq., June 22, 2011, United States v.
Spitler, Case 2:1 1-cr-429-SDW (filed June 23, 2011), ECF No. 29.
19' Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2015).
'' Jonathan Stempel, Daniel Spitler Pleads Guilty to iPad Hack, Email Address Theft, REUTERS (June 23, 2011),
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/23/daniel-spitler-ipad-hack-email-address-theft n_883240.html.;
18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2015).
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In July 2011, after Auernheimer refused to plead guilty, the government obtained an
indictment charging him with the same two offenses.1 92 In August 2012, the government
obtained a superseding indictment against Auernheimer that increased the charge in the
conspiracy count from a misdemeanor to a felony by adding the allegation that the conduct
was in furtherance of a violation of New Jersey's computer crime statute.193
Auernheimer moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue, but the district court
denied the motion.194 It found venue on the CFAA charge proper under the continuing offense
statute because Auernheimer's "purported conduct-knowing disclosure of personal
identifying information to the press-affected thousands of New Jersey residents and violated
New Jersey law." 195 Venue was also likely proper on the identity fraud charged, the court
ruled, because the predicate "unlawful activity" alleged in the identity fraud charge was the
CFAA violation alleged in the first count, and the court had already ruled that venue was
proper on the first count.1 96
At trial, the court refused to instruct the jury on venue, holding that the government
had established venue as a matter of law and that there was no genuine issue of material fact. 197
Auernheimer was found guilty on both counts, sentenced to 41 months in prison, and
immediately remanded to custody.198 He appealed, raising both substantive challenges and a
challenge to venue.199
In an opinion by Judge Michael Chagares, the Third Circuit reversed the conviction
on both counts.200 Noting that the case "raises a number of complex and novel issues that are
of great public importance in our increasingly interconnected age," the court deemed it
"necessary to reach only one that has been fundamental since our country's founding: venue.
The proper place of colonial trials was so important to the founding generation that it was
listed as a grievance in the Declaration of Independence."2 0 1
Observing that "[v]enue should be narrowly construed,"2 0 2 Judge Chagares rejected
the government's reliance on Reed's substantial contacts rule for three reasons. First, although
the Third Circuit had quoted the rule with approval in a 1987 decision, United States v.
Goldberg,203 Judge Chagares expressed doubt that the Third Circuit had embraced the
substantial contacts rule:
It is far from clear that this Court has ever "adopted" this test. We have
mentioned it only once. The test was cited in a long block quote to Reed, and
then analyzed in a single sentence. The Goldberg panel did not need to rely
on the locus of the effects of the defendant's conduct in that case because all
of his acts took place in the district in which he was tried. No panel of this
192 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1816).
' Id.; United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:20-31(a) (West 2003).
'94 United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012).
'9 Id. at *4-5.
196 Id. at *5.
' United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014).
19 Id.; Andrew 'weev' Auernheimer sentenced to 41 months for exploiting AT&T iPad security flaw,THE VERGE (Mar.
18, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/18/4118484/andrew-weev-auernheimer-sentenced-att-ipad-hack.
'9 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 529.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 532.
202 Id. at 532-33.
203 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Court has ever cited Goldberg, or any other case, for this test since - either
before, or especially after, the Supreme Court clarified the venue inquiry in
Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno.204
Second, Judge Chagares interpreted post-Reed decisions in the Second Circuit as establishing
that the substantial contacts rule "operates to limit venue, not to expand it," 2 0 5 i.e., as
"serv[ing] to limit venue in instances where the locus delicti constitutionally allows for a given
venue, but trying the case there is somehow prejudicial or unfair to the defendant."2 0 6 Finally,
Judge Chagares stressed that "[t]he Government argues only that it has minimally satisfied one
of the four prongs of the [substantial contacts] test - the 'locus of the effect of the criminal
conduct."' 2 07 "The Government has not cited," he explained, "and we have not found, any case
where the locus of the effects, standing by itself, was sufficient to confer constitutionally sound
venue."208 A crime's effects are relevant to venue, Judge Chagares added, only in "situations in
which 'an essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of it effects."' 2 09 He gave the
example of "a prosecution for Hobbs Act robbery," in which "venue may be proper in any
district where commerce is affected because the terms of the act themselves forbid affecting
commerce."210
Rather than analyze venue under Reed's substantial contacts rule, the Third Circuit
looked to the Supreme Court's decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno.211 Emphasizing
the need "to separate 'essential conduct elements' from 'circumstance element[s],"' the Third
Circuit explained that "[o]nly 'essential conduct elements' can provide the basis for venue;
'circumstance elements' cannot."2 1 2 The court pointed to the Supreme Court's observation in
Rodriguez-Moreno, with reference to its earlier decision in Cabrales, that the existence of
criminally generated proceeds had only been a "circumstance element" of the money
laundering offense charged in Cabrales and that therefore the fact that the laundered proceeds
were generated by illegal narcotics sales in Missouri did not establish venue in Missouri.2 13
Turning to the case before it, the Third Circuit held that venue was improper as to the
conspiracy count because "neither Auernheimer nor his co-conspirator Spitler performed any
essential conduct element' of the underlying CFAA violation or any overt act in furtherance
,,214of the conspiracy in New Jersey. Similarly, venue was improper on the identity fraud
charge because "Auernheimer did not commit any essential conduct of the identity fraud
,,215charge in New Jersey.
SECTION V: THE PURPOSES SERVED BY THE CONSTITUTION'S VENUE PROVISIONS
Auernheimer is a sound and welcome reaffirmation of the vitality of the constitutional
restrictions on the venue of criminal prosecutions and rejection of the government's attempt to
use Reed's substantial contacts test to loosen those restrictions. The decision is also useful in
clarifying that, although venue was sustained in Rodriguez-Moreno, the distinction the
2
0 Auernheimwr, 748 F.3d at 536 (citations omitted).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 537.
207 Id.
208 id.
209 Id. (quoting United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2000)).
210 Id.
211 Id. at 533.




215 Id. at 536.
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Supreme Court drew between conduct elements and circumstance elements tends to support a
restrictive approach to venue.
In Reed, the Second Circuit seemed to question whether the constitutional provisions
governing venue truly serve important purposes. The court observed that "the precise policies
to be furthered by venue law are not clearly defined," and that "the Supreme Court has yet to
articulate a coherent definition of the underlying policies."2 1 6 Later, a district judge in the same
circuit, Judge Edward Korman of the Eastern District of New York, went further,
characterizing the Sixth Amendment's venue provision as "a relic of a bygone era when jurors
,,211decided cases on the basis of personal knowledge.
The venue provisions of the Constitution do serve significant purposes. In the words
of Judge (as he then was) Samuel Alito, those provisions "were adopted to achieve important
substantive ends-primarily, to deter governmental abuses of power."218
A. PROXIMITY TO THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE AND RESOURCES, AND TO
PERSONS WHO KNOw HIS OR HER CHARACTER
The vast majority of the time, the district where the crime allegedly occurred is the
district where the defendant resides. Although the Supreme Court has deemed "erroneous" the
notion that "criminal defendants have a constitutionally based right to a trial in their home
districts,"2 19 it has also recognized-in the words of Justice Frankfurter in United States v.
Johnson-that allowing the government a broad choice of venue may expose the defendant to
"the unfairness and hardship [of] trial in an environment alien" to him and "remote from home
and from appropriate facilities for defense."220 Similarly, referring to the right to a jury drawn
from the state and district where the crime was committed, Justice Story observed:
The object . . . is to secure the party accused from being dragged to a trial in
some distant state, away from his friends, and witnesses, and neighbourhood;
and thus to be subjected to the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no
common sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or prejudices
against him. Besides this; a trial in a distant state or territory might subject
221the party to the most oppressive expenses.
Concurring in Johnson, Justice Murphy underscored the importance of character witnesses and
their greater availability and greater likely impact in the district where the defendant resides:
216 United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985).
217 United States v. Hart-Williams, 967 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 129 F.3d 115 (Table),
1997 WL 701374 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997). See also United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Cabranes, J., dissenting) ("In its opinion today, the majority suggests that [the Venue Clause of the Sixth
Amendment] is somehow of diminished importance 'in today's wired world of telecommunications and
technology."').
218 United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
219 Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964).
220 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); see also United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958) ("The provision for trial in the
vicinity of the crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a
remote place."); Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 78 (1905) ("To require a citizen to undertake a long journey across the
continent to face his accusers, and to incur the expense of taking his witnesses, and of employing counsel in a distant
city, involves a serious hardship, to which he ought not to be subjected if the case can be tried in a court of his own
jurisdiction."); United States v. Clark, 728 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting challenge to venue in part because
defendant did not suggest that government's choice of venue will create 'needless hardship"' (quoting Johnson, 323
U.S. at 275)).
221 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1775 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
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Very often the difference between liberty and imprisonment in cases where
the direct evidence offered by the government and the defendant is evenly
balanced depends upon the presence of character witnesses. The defendant
is more likely to obtain their presence in the district of his residence, which
in this instance is usually the place where the prohibited article is mailed.
The inconvenience, expense and loss of time involved in transplanting these
witnesses to testify in trials far removed from their homes are often too
great to warrant their use. Moreover, they are likely to lose much of their
222effectiveness before a distant jury that knows nothing of their reputations.
B. ACCESS TO EVIDENCE
Fact witnesses, documents, and other evidence are more likely to be found in the
district where the crime was committed than elsewhere. In Justice Story's words, "trial in a
distant state or territory might subject the party . . . to the inability of procuring proper
witnesses to establish his innocence."2 23
C. JUROR VALUES AND EXPERIENCE
The right to be tried in the district in which the alleged offense was committed is also
important because of the jury's role in, as Judge Learned Hand put it, "tempering [the] rigor"
of the law "by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions."2 24 As six judges of the
Second Circuit recognized in a recent opinion, the Sixth Amendment, "by defining the
community from which a federal jury must be drawn, permits the jury to operate as the
conscience of that community in judging criminal cases."2 2 5 The Supreme Court, too, has
222 Johnson, 323 U.S. at 279.
223 Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 861-62 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1775
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833)); see Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 640 (1961) (Harlan, J., joined by
Frankfurter & Clark, JJ., dissenting) ("[P]rosecution in the district in which the affidavit was executed, most often I
would suppose the place where the union offices are located, is more likely to respect the basic policy of the Sixth
Amendment than would a prosecution in the district where the affidavit was filed. The witnesses and relevant
circumstances surrounding the contested issues in such cases more probably will be found in the district of the
execution of the affidavit than at the place of filing."); Clark, 728 F.3d at 625 (rejecting venue challenge in part
because defendant "has not argued that trial in the Southern District of Illinois will subject him to 'oppressive
expenses, or ... to the inability of procuring proper witnesses to establish his innocence."' (quoting Palma-Ruedas,
121 F.3d at 861-62 (Alito, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (quoting Story, supra, § 1775))); Nadolny, 601
F.2d at 943 ("When venue is laid in the proper district the one in which the crime was committed witnesses are more
readily available, and the operative facts and situs of the incident are closer at hand."), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Frederick, 835 F.2d 1211, 1214, 1215 n.Il (7th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Posner, 549 F.
Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting motion to transfer prosecution for tax evasion involving charitable
donations of land in Miami from Southern District of New York to Southern District of Florida in part because a view
of the land involved would be possible in Florida but not in New York).
224 United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 at
281; see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1131-32 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Human fraility being what it is, a
prosecutor disposed by unworthy motives could likely establish some basis in fact for bringing charges against anyone
he wants to book, but the jury system operates in fact, so that the jury will not convict when they empathize with the
defendant, as when the offense is one they see themselves as likely to commit, or consider generally acceptable or
condonable under the mores of the community." (cross-reference omitted)).
225 United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 2009) (Raggi, J., joined by Jacobs, C.J. & Cabranes, Parker,
Wesley & Livingston, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 284 (Calabresi, J., dissenting)
("The Framers found the local nature of a jury, and local values embodied in that jury, to be so important that they
made it a constitutional requirement that juries in federal cases be not only 'impartial' but 'of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."' (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 520 n.15 (1968) ("one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making. . . a selection [between
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observed that "the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence."226 The
ethical conventions and values that a jury can contribute to the system of justice ordinarily
227should be those of a jury drawn from the region in which the alleged offense was committed.
What persons in one part of the country might consider unethical might be deemed acceptable
in another region.
D. AVOIDING FORUM-SHOPPING BY THE GOVERNMENT
Finally, as Justice Frankfurter also observed in Johnson, granting the prosecution a
broad choice of venue "leads to the appearance of abuses, if not to abuses, in the selection of
what may be deemed a tribunal favorable to the prosecution. 228 It encourages forum-
shopping, which is objectionable in matters involving enforcement of the criminal laW 2 29 just
230,2as it is in ordinary civil cases, cases involving alleged "enemy combatants,"231 and cases
involving aliens seeking to avoid deportation.232
Affording prosecutors a wide choice of permissible venues has become especially
problematic in recent decades as Congress has created an enormous number of new federal
crimes. In 1983, the Office of Legal Policy of the United States Department of Justice
reviewed the United States Code page by page and counted approximately 3,000 federal
226 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) ("It
is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man."); Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of
Ill., 949 N.E.2d 155, 176 (Ill. App. 2011) ("Juries have the unique ability to articulate community values." (quotation
marks omitted)); Johnson v. United States, 613 A.2d 888, 901 (D.C. 1992) ("[Jurors'] collective experiences and
judgments are particularly adept in achieving justice").
227 Particularly in prosecutions of alleged white collar crime, guilt or innocence may turn on the application of
extremely malleable standards. For example, in cases involving alleged mail or wire fraud offenses, juries are
sometimes instructed that "[a] scheme or artifice to defraud may describe a departure from fundamental honesty,
moral uprightness, or fair play and candid business dealings in the general ife of the community." United States v.
Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 371 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting jury instructions). The unfairness of putting a citizen's liberty at
stake based on standards such as this, in a forum far from where the conduct at issue occurred, is apparent.
228 United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); see also Travis, 364 U.S. at 634 ("[V]enue provisions in Acts
of Congress should not be so freely construed as to give the Government the choice of 'a tribunal favorable' to it."
(quoting Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275)); Clark, 728 F.3d at 625 (rejecting challenge to venue in part because defendant
did not suggest hat prosecution will cause "the 'appearance of abuses ... in the selection of what may be deemed a
tribunal favorable to the prosecution' (quoting Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275)); United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161,
164 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that the Constitution provides "a safety net, which ensures that a criminal defendant cannot
be tried in a distant, remote, or unfriendly forum solely at the prosecutor's whim. Seen in this light, it is readily
apparent hat venue requirements promote both fairness and public confidence in the criminal justice system." (quoting
Johnson, 323 U.S. at 276)).
229 See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 831
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1981); Jones v Oklahoma, 481 P.2d 169, 171-
72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); cf. State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989) (per curiam) ("To meet due
process requirements, capital and other felony cases must be [assigned] . . . on a random or rotating basis or under
some other procedure adopted by the court which does not vest the district attorney with power to choose the judge to
whom a particular case is assigned."); People v. Preciado, 144 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) ("The plea
bargain in this case was improper; the district attorney had no authority to promise that a particular judge would
impose sentence. The 'promise' to a defendant that a particular judge will handle any particular matter in the future is
improper. This type of arrangement encourages 'judge-shopping,' an evil that should be prevented." (footnote
omitted)).
230 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
231 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 428, 447 (2004) ("Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to
challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the
petition in the district of confinement... This rule, derived from the terms of the habeas statute, serves the important
purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas petitioners.").
232 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 694 (1st Cir. 2000).
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233crimes. By 2007, the number of federal crimes had increased by nearly fifty percent to "at
least 4,450."234
One result of this expansion of federal crimes is that federal prosecutors often can
bring charges under many statutes on the basis of a single course of conduct:
Given the breadth and variety of the federal criminal code, it is
likely that a defendant's behavior will potentially violate a multitude of
overlapping criminal statutes, especially where white-collar crime is
involved. The same course of fraudulent conduct, for example, might
constitute mail fraud (if the mails have been used to carry part of it out); wire
fraud (if a telephone or the internet was used as part of the execution of the
scheme); securities fraud under Title 18 (if the fraud was related to
securities); securities fraud under Title 15 (if the fraud was in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities); false statements to an agency of the
government (if an agency, including the SEC, was one of the "victims" of
the fraud) under Title 18; and false statements to the SEC under Title 15. If
two defendants are involved, a conspiracy charge can likely be added.235
The "morass of ... overlapping statutes"236 available to federal prosecutors makes it
easier for them to obtain a conviction on at least one count even if the defendant is innocent of
wrongdoing. "[W]here the prosecution's evidence is weak," Justice Stevens has observed, "its
ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the possibility that, even though
innocent, the defendant may be found guilty on one or more charges as a result of a
compromise verdict." 237 In the words of defense attorney John Cline,
[M]any federal prosecutors take advantage of overlapping federal criminal
offenses to charge the same course of conduct under two, or three, or more
different statutes or regulations. Instead of a one-count indictment charged
under a single statute, the jury might have ten or twenty or a hundred counts
charged under several different statutes. The result is often jury compromise.
Jurors cannot agree unanimously whether the defendant is guilty, so, as a
231compromise, they convict on some counts and acquit on others.
23 Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code Reform, 1 CRIM. L.F. 99, 110 (1989).
234 John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, 26 Legal Memorandum 1 (June 16, 2008),
available at www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/1m26.cfm.
235 Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a
Law of Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2005) (footnotes omitted). Professor Seigel was a federal
prosecutor for nine years, first as an organized crime prosecutor in Philadelphia and then as First Assistant U.S.
Attorney in Tampa. Id. at 1107 n.1. Judge Harold Greene similarly observed that "[a]s a consequence of the
proliferation of criminal laws that has occurred in recent years, almost any criminal act can today be prosecuted, at the
option of the prosecutor, on the basis of a great many different charges, from an entire menu of substantive offenses, to
various conspiracy counts, aiding and abetting, and any number of enhancements." United States v. Roberts, 726 F.
Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
236 Hearing Before the Over-criminalization Task Force of 2014, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 47 (2014)
(written statement of John D. Cline, Esq.); see also id. ("[T]here are more than two dozen different false statement
statutes in Chapter 47 of Title 18; there are seven different fraud statutes in Chapter 63 of Title 18; and I count
nineteen different obstruction offenses in Chapter 73 of Title 18.").
237 Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 868 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
372 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting)).
238 Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014, supra note 239, at 47. United States v. Natale, 719
F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1875 (2014), is an example of a recent case in which prosecutors
apparently gained an advantage by charging the same course of conduct in multiple counts. Natale, a vascular surgeon,
was alleged to have operated on ordinary aortic aneurysms that two of his patients suffered from but billed for
2016 59
23
Mogin: Fundamental Since Our Country's Founding: United States v. Auernh
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2016
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Broadening the government's choice of venue by applying Reed's substantial contacts
test would only exacerbate the problem described by Cline since it would maximize the
number of charges the government could bring in a single prosecution. If the traditional
approach of determining where the offense was committed means that sometimes the
government cannot join all charges in a single prosecution, so be it. Given the proliferation of
federal offenses, the government will typically be able to obtain an indictment that contains an
ample number of counts even if has to omit some offenses committed in another district. In
Reed itself, the charges that the court considered were charges in addition to the charges of
securities fraud and wire fraud for which venue was concededly proper in the Southern District
of New York.239
SECTION VI: CONCLUSION
Thirty-five years ago, in an opinion by Judge James Hunter III, the Third Circuit
declared that "[t]hough our nation has changed in ways which it is difficult to imagine that the
Framers of the Constitution could have foreseen, the rights of criminal defendants which they
sought to protect in the venue provisions of the Constitution are neither outdated nor
outmoded."240 The same observation would be equally apt today. The Reed court may have
been correct that the Supreme Court's explication of the policies underlying those provisions
has left something to be desired, but a citizen's right to be tried in the district where the alleged
offense was committed continues to protect important interests.
operations on renal artery aneurysms-which are typically more difficult procedures and are reimbursed by Medicare
at a higher rate-and written operative notes to make it appear he had performed the more difficult type of operation.
See id. at 722, 724-25. As to each operation, the indictment charged both health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347 and the making of a false statement in a matter involving a health care benefit program in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1035. Indictment at 1, 5, 12-14, 17-20, Natale, 719 F.3d 719 (No. 11CR594). As to one of the operations, the
indictment also charged mail fraud. Id. at 15-16. Natale was acquitted on the charges of health care fraud and mail
fraud but found guilty on the two false statement charges. Natale, 719 F.3d at 728.
239 United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 479 (2d Cir. 1985).
240 United States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 (3d Cir. 1980).
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